Retired Green Beret warns Israel’s actions risk trapping US in prolonged and costly Iran war

Retired Green Beret and former congressional candidate Joe Kent has emerged as one of the most prominent U.S. veterans warning that Israel’s current confrontation with Iran could pull Washington into a grinding regional war. Drawing on his own service in Iraq and Syria, he frames the conflict not as an abstract foreign policy debate but as a looming test of U.S. military capacity, domestic politics, and public patience.

As Israeli strikes on Iranian and allied targets intensify and Tehran responds across the region, Kent contends that Washington is drifting toward a long, expensive fight that serves neither American security nor the interests of U.S. troops who would be asked to fight it.

What happened

The latest crisis accelerated after Israel and the United States carried out a large-scale attack on Iranian military assets and infrastructure, described by regional analysts as a major escalation in the long shadow war between the two countries. The coordinated strikes targeted Iranian air defenses, missile sites, and facilities tied to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, raising fears of a direct state-on-state confrontation rather than the proxy clashes that have defined the past decade. Experts warned that the scope of the operation signaled a shift from deterrence to offensive pressure, with one assessment describing how the allies had “just unleashed a major attack on Iran” and questioning what escalation ladder might follow these expanded strikes.

Tehran responded by widening the battlefield. Iranian forces and aligned militias launched missiles and drones at Israeli territory and U.S.-linked sites across the region, including in Kuwait, which hosts American troops and logistics hubs. Iranian officials publicly rejected a 48-hour ultimatum reportedly delivered by former President Donald Trump, who had demanded that Tehran halt its attacks or face additional U.S. military action. Instead of backing down, Iranian commanders announced that they would target Israel and Kuwait in retaliation, directly challenging American red lines and testing Washington’s willingness to defend partners under Iranian fire.

Inside Washington, the intensifying conflict triggered unusual dissent from within the national security establishment. Joe Kent, who had been appointed director of the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center, resigned from his post in protest over the direction of the Iran war. In public comments after his resignation, Kent argued that the administration’s approach risked dragging the United States into a large-scale conflict in support of Israel’s maximalist objectives against Iran. His departure from the counterterrorism center, an institution built to coordinate responses to threats like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, underscored how far the Iran confrontation had moved from limited counterterrorism into the realm of major interstate war.

On the ground, the fighting has spread beyond Israel and Iran’s borders. Iranian-backed groups in Lebanon and Syria have stepped up rocket and missile attacks on northern Israel, while Israeli aircraft and artillery have struck targets across Lebanon, including positions linked to Hezbollah. In Iraq and the Gulf, U.S. bases have come under intermittent fire from militias aligned with Tehran, prompting American retaliatory strikes that further blur the line between support for Israel and direct U.S. participation. Live updates from regional battlefields describe a pattern of tit-for-tat attacks that now connects fronts in Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and the Gulf, with U.S. forces repeatedly drawn into frontline exchanges.

Why it matters

Kent’s warning carries weight because it is rooted in his experience as a special forces operator who saw firsthand how limited missions in the Middle East can evolve into open-ended wars. He argues that Israel’s strategy toward Iran, which seeks to degrade Tehran’s military and nuclear capabilities through repeated strikes, cannot succeed without sustained American logistical, intelligence, and air defense support. In his view, that dependency gives Israel strong leverage over Washington’s choices and increases the risk that U.S. leaders will feel compelled to follow Jerusalem up the escalation ladder rather than risk a public rupture.

Strategically, a prolonged war with Iran would stretch U.S. forces already tasked with deterring Russia in Europe and managing competition with China in the Pacific. Carrier strike groups, air wings, and missile defense units diverted to the Gulf and eastern Mediterranean would be less available for contingencies involving the South China Sea or the defense of NATO allies. Military planners warn that even a limited but sustained air and naval campaign against Iran’s missile forces, drones, and proxies would consume precision munitions, surveillance assets, and refueling capacity at a pace that could take years to replenish.

Financially, the costs would be substantial. Previous campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan required hundreds of billions of dollars for operations, reconstruction, and veterans’ care. While a conflict with Iran might not involve large U.S. ground invasions at the outset, the need to protect bases, ships, and regional partners from Iranian missiles and drones would drive spending on air defenses and force protection. Kent and other critics argue that every additional dollar committed to a discretionary regional war is a dollar not available for domestic priorities or for long-term competition with technologically advanced rivals.

Politically, the risk is that Washington becomes locked into a cycle where Israeli decisions to strike Iranian assets trigger Iranian retaliation, which then pressures U.S. leaders to respond in kind to demonstrate credibility. Kent frames this as a trap in which American policymakers effectively outsource the timing of escalation to a partner government that faces its own internal pressures and security doctrine. Once U.S. forces are directly engaged, backing down becomes harder, even if public support erodes.

The domestic fallout is already visible. Kent’s resignation from the National Counterterrorism Center is a rare example of a senior security official stepping down over a single theater of operations. His departure signals that at least some inside the system believe the Iran campaign is drifting away from core counterterrorism missions and toward a broader regional war. That perception could fuel congressional scrutiny, particularly from lawmakers wary of authorizing another open-ended use of force in the Middle East.

Regional stability is also at stake. Iran has shown that it can activate a network of proxies from Yemen to Lebanon, threatening shipping lanes, energy infrastructure, and civilian populations. Israel’s response, focused on degrading those networks, risks heavy civilian casualties and damage to already fragile states like Lebanon and Iraq. A prolonged conflict could push those societies closer to collapse, create new refugee flows, and open space for extremist groups that thrive in chaos, repeating patterns seen after the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

What to watch next

The first variable to watch is whether Israel continues high-intensity strikes on Iranian territory and senior commanders or shifts back to a pattern of lower-profile covert operations. A sustained tempo of overt attacks would keep pressure on Tehran to respond in visible ways, which in turn increases the likelihood that U.S. assets or personnel are hit. Any mass-casualty incident involving American troops, ships, or diplomats would dramatically narrow Washington’s political space for restraint.

Tehran’s calculus will also shape the trajectory of the conflict. Iranian leaders must balance the desire to deter Israel and demonstrate resolve against the risk of triggering a direct U.S. assault on critical infrastructure and leadership targets. If Iran continues to target sites in Israel and in countries that host U.S. facilities, such as Kuwait, it signals a willingness to gamble that Washington will avoid full-scale war. If instead Tehran channels retaliation primarily through deniable proxies, it might indicate a preference for a long, low-intensity confrontation rather than a rapid spiral.

The internal U.S. debate will intensify as well. Congress faces pressure to clarify the legal basis for current operations, especially if air and naval strikes against Iranian assets expand beyond immediate self-defense. Lawmakers skeptical of another Middle East war may push for explicit authorization votes, funding limits, or reporting requirements. Kent’s public break with the administration gives those voices a high-profile national security figure who can argue, from a hawkish background, that supporting Israel does not require unconditional backing for every escalation.